PM says no to Christian gift of friendship flowers, so as not to upset Obama.

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Perplexity

“…upon the earth distress•Strongs 4928: sunoche, soon-okh-ay´; from 4912; restraint, i.e. (figuratively) anxiety: — anguish, distress. of nations, with perplexity•Strongs 640: aporia, ap-or-ee´-a; from the same as 639; a (state of) quandary:—perplexity.
•Strongs 639: aporeo, ap-or-eh´-o; from a compound of 1 (as a negative particle) and the base of 4198; to have no way out, i.e. be at a loss (mentally):— (stand in) doubt, be perplexed….”
—Luke 21:25

Jacobs Troubles

“For, lo, the days come, saith the LORD, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah, saith the LORD: and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it. And these are the words that the LORD spake concerning Israel and concerning Judah. For thus saith the LORD; We have heard a voice of trembling, of fear, and not of peace. Ask ye now, and see whether a man doth travail with child? wherefore do I see every man with his hands on his loins, as a woman in travail, and all faces are turned into paleness? Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s trouble; but he shall be saved out of it. or it shall come to pass in that day, saith the LORD of hosts, that I will break his yoke from off thy neck, and will burst thy bonds, and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him: But they shall serve the LORD their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them.”
—Jeremiah 30:3-9

Has the fight between US President Barack Obama and Israel become so fetid that it can overcome the fragrance of more than 10,000 roses?

That appeared to be the case on Thursday, when officials in the Prime Minister’s Office made clear that they cannot accept a donation of more than 800 dozen yellow roses from American Christians who were upset by reports of Obama’s treatment of Binyamin Netanyahu in the White House last week.

Florida-based radio host and author Janet Porter was so incensed by what she thought was Obama’s inappropriate behavior that she called upon her listeners to give Netanyahu yellow roses to symbolize friendship, with each bouquet costing a symbolic price of $19.48.

The response was overwhelming as Christian supporters of Israel went online to the Web site of Porter’s Faith2action organization and ordered the flowers, which were to be accompanied by a card with the words, “Be encouraged, Americans stand with you,” along with a quote from a psalm: “The Lord builds up Jerusalem.”

Porter contacted respected Beit Shemesh-based florist Richard Kovler, who would be ready to deliver the huge amount of flowers after Pessah ends next week. But he needs someone in the Prime Minister’s Office to receive them.

When Kovler contacted the appropriate Netanyahu adviser, he was told that the Prime Minister’s Office could not get involved, because Netanyahu must be very careful to avoid anything that smacks of disrespect for the president at such a sensitive time.

Kovler said it would be a shame if he went to Netanyahu’s official residence in Jerusalem’s Rehavia neighborhood and was forced to leave the flowers in the street.

“I understand the politics of why the prime minister cannot publicly support this effort, but on the other hand if these flowers are rejected, it could also cause a lot of anger among the literally thousands of American Christians who are just trying to show Israel some very much needed goodwill,” Kovler said.

“It looks like [Netanyahu’s advisers] are spitting in the face of these friends, even though Obama could be out of office in less than three years while these friends will be with us for a long time.”

Kovler said he would donate a portion of the proceeds from the flowers to charity. One possible solution for where the flowers could go was Jerusalem’s two Hadassah hospitals. But hospital officials turned down the gift, because they were worried about the impact of that many flowers on patients with allergies.

Porter told The Jerusalem Post that she believes Netanyahu could still be persuaded to receive the flowers. She said that there was nothing anti-Obama on the card and that the campaign merely intended to show support for Israel.

“We are sending a message in a beautiful way that Obama needs to learn how to treat friends,” Porter said. “The prime minister needs to know that the Obama administration doesn’t speak for Americans. I want his office to be covered with flowers. All of Israel should know that the US people stand for Israel with the sweet aroma of encouragement.”

She went further in a column for the Web site WorldNetDaily, in which she expressed outrage that after US Vice President Joe Biden came an hour and a half late to a dinner in Jerusalem hosted by Netanyahu, when the prime minister came to the White House, Obama left the meeting in the middle to go have dinner with his family.

“I never heard whether Prime Minister Netanyahu was at least offered table scraps from Obama’s table,” she wrote. “No, those, I’m sure, went to the dog, who was treated far better than the leader of Israel.”

Porter is the president and founder of Faith2Action, which aims to turn people of faith into people of action to win what she calls the cultural war for life, liberty and the family. She has a nationally syndicated daily radio program, is a correspondent for Christian networks, and is the author of the book The Criminalization of Christianity.

Netanyahu’s spokesman responded by promising that the issue would be dealt with in a professional manner.

“It is well known that our enemies arise against us due to our sins,” he reminded the crowd. “By each and every one of us doing deep, heartfelt repentance, we can uproot and cancel the harsh decree. Through fervently praying with all of our souls, begging G-d to forgive us for the sins which have brought this cruel enemy upon us, we can influence the situation on the ground. Just as the united prayers of the Jewish people have brought us rain, so too they can save us from the present danger.”

“For, lo, the days come, saith the LORD, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah, saith the LORD: and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it. And these are the words that the LORD spake concerning Israel and concerning Judah. For thus saith the LORD; We have heard a voice of trembling, of fear, and not of peace. Ask ye now, and see whether a man doth travail with child? wherefore do I see every man with his hands on his loins, as a woman in travail, and all faces are turned into paleness? Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s trouble; but he shall be saved out of it. or it shall come to pass in that day, saith the LORD of hosts, that I will break his yoke from off thy neck, and will burst thy bonds, and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him: But they shall serve the LORD their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them.”
—Jeremiah 30:3-9

(IsraelNN.com) Speaking to a gathering of students Tuesday night, the elder Kabbalist, Rabbi Eliyahu Leon Levi of Bnei Brak, warned that the war against Hamas should not be taken lightly.

“The Hamas has long-range Grad missiles that are aimed at our country’s strategic facilities,” he stated. “The threat is a life and death danger for the people of Israel. Imagine the catastrophe if a nuclear facility was damaged, causing the release of radioactivity in the air. People must be awakened to the severity of the danger and the Israeli army must strike at the enemy with its full force, without any mercy and external considerations.”

On several occasions, Rabbi Leon tipped off the Israeli military about threats to the country’s security. Years ago, the kabbalist elder revealed the existence of an extensive network of underground tunnels both on the Egyptian-Gaza border and in the Gaza Strip. On another occasion, the Rabbi alerted Colonel Moti Yogev who in turn reported to the Israel Air Force of the approach of an enemy ship, stockpiled with arms and missiles, on the way to Gaza. The air force checked out the ship, and Rabbi Leon’s report was found to be accurate. The threat was dealt with.

Rabbi Levy said that Gaza had become stockpiled with tens of thousands of missiles, like Lebanon. “Air force strikes are of limited effectiveness,” he declared. The Hamas has built a massive network of deep underground storage facilities, fortified with layers of concrete.” He said the missiles came from Iran, by way of Egypt. Once in Egypt, the missiles are transported by trucks to the border of Gaza, where they are smuggled into Gaza in small vehicles via a two-kilometer underground highway. “In this fashion,” he explained, “Hamas is being supplied with an unlimited arsenal of weapons and supplies. Only ground forces can destroy this secret supply route, by locating the tunnels and blowing them up, even if it means casualties to our troops. This ground operation has to be carried out now, before it is too late,” he warned.

To support his forecast, he reminded the gathering of a miracle during the first Gulf War, during a prayer gathering of hundreds in Herzliya, a short distance away from the central gas storage facility, Glilot. During the prayers, the Rabbi said he “received a spiritual fax,” that a rocket was on the way. In the words of Avraham Ben Shushan from Kiryat Arba who attended the prayer rally, “Rabbi Leon suddenly announced that a rocket was headed towards the area and that everyone should disperse and find cover.” Moments thereafter, the sirens sounded and a missile landed nearby. “They were aiming for the gas storage facility,” Rabbi Leon said, “But our prayers knocked the missile off course.”

In addition, he said, “You don’t have to be a prophet to see the increasing sympathy for Hamas on the part of the Arabs in Israel. Danger threatens us from without and within.”

Rabbi Leon said that every Jew had to enlist in the fight. “Those of us who are not in the army must become spiritual soldiers with the same day-and-night spirit of sacrifice and sense of duty as our boys in uniform. It is our prayers that give fuel to our fighter planes and tanks and direct our missiles on course.”

Rabbi Leon listed several spiritual offensives: In our battle against the Hamas, the Jewish people in Israel must unite by judging all Jews in a scale of merit, even blatant sinners. Even those who seem to transgress unwittingly out of compulsion, because of a lack of Jewish education and the cultural pollution of the times, we must view them with love and judge them favorably, the Rabbi urged.

He also called upon students to increase supplications for salvation, including the tearful nightly recital of “Tikun Hatzot,” the special midnight lament.

Especially important, he emphasized, was the upcoming “Shovavim” period, when for six weeks congregations will gather all over Israel for special prayers, called “Tikun HaYesod,” over sexual transgressions.

“It is well known that our enemies arise against us due to our sins,” he reminded the crowd. “By each and every one of us doing deep, heartfelt repentance, we can uproot and cancel the harsh decree. Through fervently praying with all of our souls, begging G-d to forgive us for the sins which have brought this cruel enemy upon us, we can influence the situation on the ground. Just as the united prayers of the Jewish people have brought us rain, so too they can save us from the present danger.”
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Sins of Sodom—Committed Abomination

“And they were haughty, and committed abomination before me: therefore I took them away as I saw good.”
—Ezekiel 16:50

“And they forsook the LORD, and served Baal and Ashtaroth.”
—Judges 2:13

Jacob’s Trouble

“Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s trouble he shall be saved out of it.”
—Jeremiah 30:7

After weeks of preparations for the largest sex event of its kind in Israel, organizers were forced to cancel it this week due to public pressure and threats exerted on the owner of the venue where the sex fest was to take place.

The event in question, which was scheduled to take place on “International Orgasm Day,” aimed to bring together some 250 participants seeking to promote world peace through multiple orgasms reached by masturbation or sex.

The orgy was organized by the Raelian movement, a UFO religion whose followers believe humankind was created by aliens. The group’s spokesman, Kobi Drori, said that the orgy was meant to include straights, gays, lesbians and bisexuals, all of them over 18.

“The purpose of the event was to try and bring world peace through mass orgasm, this by experiencing consensual sex and natural, uninterrupted pleasure. It was important to make love without feeling guilty or shy,” he explained.

Drori protested the fact that nowadays the words “war,” “violence” and “murder” have become more legitimate than “sex,” “orgasm” and “pleasure.”

“It should be the other way around. Several years ago an Iraqi boy whose limbs were amputated was shown on TV and everybody treated this as if it was okay, but when Janet Jackson exposed her breast during the Superbowl the American nation was appalled.

“We wanted to put into practice the saying ‘make love, not war’.”

‘Society based on self-fulfillment’
According to Drori, the orgy was just the first in a series of events dedicated to promoting this objective. On January 22 the movement will hold a conference on sexuality and masturbation with experts and writers in the field.

He also vowed that the cancelation of this year’s orgy would not deter the Raelians from setting up another sex fest next year.

The Raelian movement has several hundreds followers in Israel and some 70,000 members worldwide.
“We don’t believe in demons, ghosts and gods,” said Drori. “The group’s primary goal is to inform humanity, without attempting to persuade, regarding scientific messages that deal with the origins of life on earth.

“The second goal is to expedite the establishment of a society based on the principles of non-violence, solidarity, self-fulfillment and pleasure. To establish one global currency, one global government and harness science to the service of humanity, and not against humanity,” he concluded.

]]> http://www.inthedays.com/days-of-lot/mega-orgy-in-tel-aviv-cancelled-due-to-public-pressure/feed/ 4 http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/state-frees-teachers-to-criticize-evolution/ http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/state-frees-teachers-to-criticize-evolution/#comments Sun, 29 Jun 2008 14:10:05 +0000 John http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/state-frees-teachers-to-criticize-evolution/
Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal

Global warming, origins of life, cloning also may be scrutinized

“But thou, O Daniel, shut up the words, and seal the book, even to the time of the end: many shall run to and fro, and knowledge shall be increased.”
—Daniel 12:4

Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal this week signed into law the Louisiana Science Education Act, which allows school districts to permit teachers to present evidence, analysis and critique of evolution and other prevalent scientific theories in public school classrooms.

The law came to the governor’s desk after overwhelming support in the legislature, including a unanimous vote in the state’s Senate and a 93-4 vote in the House.

The act has been criticized by some as an attempt to insert religion into science education and hailed by others as a blow for academic freedom in the face of pressure to ignore flaws in politically correct scientific theories.

Robert Crowther, director of communications for The Discovery Institute, a Seattle-based think tank on science and culture, called the act necessary.

In an article posted on The Discovery Institute’s evolution news website, Crowther wrote, “The law is needed for two reasons. First, around the country, science teachers are being harassed, intimidated, and sometimes fired for trying to present scientific evidence critical of Darwinian theory along with the evidence that supports it. Second, many school administrators and teachers are fearful or confused about what is legally allowed when teaching about controversial scientific issues like evolution. The Louisiana Science Education Act clarifies what teachers may be allowed to do.”

Specifically, the act allows teachers in the state’s public schools to present evidence both for and against Darwinian theories of evolution and allows local school boards to approve supplemental materials that may open critical discussions of evolution, the origins of life, global warming, human cloning and other scientific theories.

Teachers are still required by the act to follow the standardized science curriculum, and school districts are required to authorize both the teachers’ classes and additional materials. The state’s Board of Elementary and Secondary Education will have the power to prohibit materials it deems inappropriate, and the act prohibits religious instruction.

Section 1D of the act states that the law “shall not be construed to promote any religious doctrine, promote discrimination for or against a particular set of religious beliefs, or promote discrimination for or against religion or nonreligion.”

Despite section 1D, many national voices, including the Americans United for Separation of Church and State, a New York Times editorial, and the American Civil Liberties Union opposed the measure.

Marjorie Esman, state director of Lousiana’s ACLU told the New Orleans Times-Picayune, “To the extent that this might invite religion in the public school classroom, we will do everything we can do to keep religion out.”

John West, a senior fellow of the Discovery Institute, however, said opponents of the bill are misunderstanding it. Rather than being about infusing intelligent design or creationism into the classroom, he contends, the bill is about giving teachers the freedom to talk about the debates that already exist in science, even among evolutionists themselves.

“This bill is not a license to propagandize against something they don’t like in science,” West told the Times-Picayune. “Someone who uses materials to inject religion into the classroom is not only violating the Constitution, they are violating the bill.”

Gov. Jindal released a statement at the time of the signing that read, in part: “I will continue to consistently support the ability of school boards and (the state Board of Elementary and Secondary Education) to make the best decisions to ensure a quality education for our children.”

]]> http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/state-frees-teachers-to-criticize-evolution/feed/ 3 http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/barak-fears-hamas-w-bank-takeover/ http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/barak-fears-hamas-w-bank-takeover/#comments Fri, 28 Mar 2008 16:12:51 +0000 John http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/barak-fears-hamas-w-bank-takeover/ Defense Minister Ehud Barak has warned the United States that gestures Israel is making to the Palestinians – including approving the transfer to the Palestinian Authority of weapons and armored vehicles, and allowing the deployment of PA policemen in West Bank cities – could ultimately backfire because Hamas could come to power in the West Bank and be better equipped to turn on Israel.

“For, lo, the days come, saith the LORD, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah, saith the LORD: and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it. And these are the words that the LORD spake concerning Israel and concerning Judah. For thus saith the LORD; We have heard a voice of trembling, of fear, and not of peace. Ask ye now, and see whether a man doth travail with child? wherefore do I see every man with his hands on his loins, as a woman in travail, and all faces are turned into paleness? Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s trouble; but he shall be saved out of it. For it shall come to pass in that day, saith the LORD of hosts, that I will break his yoke from off thy neck, and will burst thy bonds, and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him: But they shall serve the LORD their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them.”
—Jeremiah 30:3-9

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Barak issued the warning during a recent meeting with the US special envoy to Israel and the Palestinian Authority, Gen. James Jones. The Israeli defense establishment has drawn up a list of further gestures together with Jones that are set to include deploying 600 Jordanian-trained PA policemen in Jenin and the possible removal of dirt roadblocks.

“We need to keep in mind the possibility that after all we have done, Hamas will take over the West Bank, not only by force but even in the upcoming general elections,” Barak told Jones, according to defense officials. “This is certainly a possibility.”

Barak plans to present the list of gestures to US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who is set to arrive in Israel on Saturday night, during their meeting the next day.

Rice’s visit is aimed at getting both the Israelis and the Palestinians to make progress on commitments undertaken in the road map peace plan and to otherwise push forward the peace process begun at Annapolis, Maryland, in November.

The US has indicated that neither party has met its obligations, but the Bush administration has seemed particularly frustrated by Israel’s failure to remove any roadblocks or illegal outposts and its public declarations of continued settlement construction, albeit in places Israel expects to retain under any final-status agreement.

“The rhetoric, regardless of the reality, is problematic because it doesn’t help the environment in terms of the spirit of Annapolis, even if the things that are said don’t end up coming to fruition and are [expressed] because of domestic politics,” a senior US administration official told The Jerusalem Post.

But Israeli defense officials dismissed claims that Barak was facing criticism from the US for not making greater efforts to remove roadblocks or to ease restrictions in the West Bank.

“Both the Americans and the Palestinians understand that if we lift a roadblock and there is an attack we will fall back instead of moving forward in the negotiations,” one official said.

At the same time, the US has welcomed Barak’s planned moves to ease movement for West Bank Palestinians.

“These are welcome developments that indicate a desire by the Israeli authorities to move forward, to try to help improve the situation on the ground,” the administration official said.

The gestures, which have yet to be finalized, include the deployment in Jenin of 600 PA policemen currently being trained in Jordan. Barak is also considering the removal of several dirt roadblocks in the West Bank.

The armed policemen in Jenin will be charged with maintaining order in the town during the day, but the IDF will retain security control and will continue to operate in the town at night.

Other gestures included opening a VIP lane at checkpoints and exempting Palestinian businessmen who are approved by the Shin Bet (Israel Security Agency) from inspections.

While the Israelis are coming under pressure from the US to make things easier for the Palestinians, Israel is also worried that PA President Mahmoud Abbas of Fatah could become to weak too fend off a challenge from Hamas in the West Bank – in the form either of a coup similar to that which left Hamas in control of Gaza last June or a victory at the ballot box.

Hamas has recently been flexing its muscles and showing how it can play the role of spoiler in the diplomatic process – as violence from Gaza nearly ended the negotiations between Abbas and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert over the last month. A tenuous calm has prevailed in the wake of Rice’s last visit to calm tensions, and members of Fatah have been holding talks with Hamas through the mediation of Yemen.

Though the talks don’t appear to have led to reconciliation, neither the US nor Israel has been eager to see a return of the Fatah-Hamas unity government that was dissolved following the Gaza coup.

The subject is expected to be among the subjects Rice discusses with the Palestinians.

“We’ve made our views clear of the need for a Quartet-compliant government,” the Bush administration official said, referring to the Middle East Quartet’s demands that Hamas recognize Israel, renounce violence and accept previous Palestinian-Israeli agreements. “Deviations will not work.”

]]> http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/barak-fears-hamas-w-bank-takeover/feed/ 0 http://www.inthedays.com/distress-of-nations/putins-middle-east-visit-russia-is-back/ http://www.inthedays.com/distress-of-nations/putins-middle-east-visit-russia-is-back/#comments Tue, 06 Mar 2007 15:21:06 +0000 John http://www.inthedays.com/distress-of-nations/putins-middle-east-visit-russia-is-back/ Vladimir Putin’s visit to Saudi Arabia on February 11 was the first ever for any Russian or Soviet leader. Putin also visited U.S. allies Jordan and Qatar. Coming from Munich, where Putin delivered his most bellicose anti-American speech, he further delineated a Russian Middle Eastern policy at odds with Washington’s in an interview with Al-Jazeera. Putin reiterated Russia’s opposition to the Iraq war and disputed the justice of Saddam’s execution. He was also critical of U.S. democracy promotion in the Middle East, attributing the empowerment of Hamas and Hezbollah to January 2006 parliamentary elections promoted by Washington. At the same time, he justified Russia’s refusal to recognize Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations due to their electoral victories.

Distress of Nations

“And say, Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I am against thee, O Gog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal:”
—Ezekiel 38:3

Jacob’s Trouble

Please read Eze 36 and 37. These prophecy’s have come to pass. Now, read Eze 38 for it will also soon come to pass. click here for chapter 38
—Editor

Also during his visit to the Saudi capital, Putin stunned the world with an offer to sell Saudi Arabia “peaceful” nuclear reactors. In addition, he offered 150 T-90 tanks and other weapons. During his Middle East tour, the Russian president indicated Russia’s willingness to sell helicopters, build rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) factories, provide sophisticated anti-aircraft systems (the Carapace (Pantsyr), TOR M1, and Strelets), and sell the Saudis expanded satellite launches and an opportunity to join the Russian satellite navigation system, GLONASS.

During his visit to Qatar, the third largest natural gas producer in the world, Putin said that Iran’s proposal to form an OPEC-style cartel of gas producers was “an interesting idea” —after his minister had dismissed it out of hand—and invited Saudi banks to open wholly-owned subsidiaries in Russia.

Putin summed up Russia’s new foreign policy and Middle East policy as follows:

From the point of view of stability in this or that region or in the world in general, the balance of power is the main achievement of these past decades and indeed of the whole history of humanity. It is one of the most important conditions for maintaining global stability and security….

I do not understand why some of our partners [Europe and the U.S.]…see themselves as cleverer and more civilized and think that they have the right to impose their standards on others. The thing to remember is that standards that are imposed from the outside, including in the Middle East, rather than being a product of a society’s natural internal development, lead to tragic consequences, and the best example of this is Iraq.

This Realpolitik was praised in Arab capitals, where the old Soviet anti-Western and anti-Israel stance is still remembered fondly. King Abdullah I of Saudi Arabia bestowed the King Faisal Award on Putin, calling him “a statesman, a man of peace, a man of justice” —quite a turnaround from the jihad against the Soviets funded by the Saudis 20 years ago during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It is also worth noting that Saudi Arabia officially decries the 100,000 killed and 500,000 displaced Muslims in Chechnya, while private groups based in the Gulf support terrorists there.

At Odds with the West

A number of factors drive Putin’s recent rhetoric and actions in the Middle East. First, by embracing Middle Eastern monarchies and Islamist authoritarianism in Iran, he signals Russia’s ongoing movement away from Western norms of internal political behavior. This has important implications, as 2007 and 2008 are election years in Russia. Putin is loudly rejecting the American approach of democracy and human rights, which has stumbled and sputtered in the Middle East.

Second, Russia is following the Soviet model of opposing first the British and then the U.S. presence in the Middle East by playing to anti-Western sentiment in the “street” and among the elites. Putin’s Munich speech, his Al-Jazeera interview, and his press conferences in Jordan and Qatar solidified the Kremlin’s public diplomacy message, emphasizing its differences with Washington.

Third, the Russian leadership is concerned about high Muslim birthrates in Russia, especially as the Slavic Orthodox population is declining. Russia is facing an increasingly radicalized Muslim population along its southern “soft underbelly,” particularly in the North Caucasus, where two Chechen rebellions, even though they were effectively crushed, led to the spread of Salafi Islam. Many young Russian Muslims view themselves more as members of the global Islamic Ummah (community) than as citizens of Mother Russia. Keeping Muslim powers such as Saudi Arabia and Iran at bay, preventing them from supporting insurgencies in Eurasia, and toning down radicalization are unspoken but important items on the Kremlin’s agenda.

Finally, Russia is a high cost oil producer, the largest oil producer in the world, the largest oil exporter outside of OPEC, and the largest gas producer. As such, it seeks to maintain high energy prices—usually generated by tensions and conflicts in the Middle East. Russia is perfectly willing to sell weapons to both sides of the growing Sunni-Shia divide. This was evidenced when it offered the same nuclear reactors and the same anti-aircraft systems to both Iran and to the Arab Gulf states, which are increasingly nervous about Iran’ s growing military power and nuclear ambitions. Аs one Russian observer put it, weapons sales create allies. Russia is using weapons and nuclear reactors the way imperial Germany used railroads—to bolster influence and to undermine the dominant power in the Middle East.

What Can Washington Do?

Clearly, the new Middle East—in which U.S. power and prestige are threatened in Iraq and where Moscow is challenging America’s superpower status—will be a more competitive and challenging environment. Today’s Middle East needs to be viewed with the realism and toughness that its history and culture require.

The U.S., as a status quo power in the Middle East, should bolster its relations with pro-Western regimes in the Gulf. While some weapons sales and business projects will inevitably take place, only by maintaining a security umbrella in the Gulf can the U.S. maintain more clout in the region than Russia.

The U.S. should continue dialogue with Moscow on issues of mutual concern, such as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, and destabilizing weapons sales. But more importantly, it should provide military assurances to Gulf countries against Iranian encroachment, which Russia is incapable of giving. It should expand cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which threatens the Middle Eastern monarchies. And it should be competitive in proposing cutting-edge economic ventures, an area in which Russia lacks expertise, while granting access to U.S. capital markets for development projects.

After a 20-year hiatus, Russia is forcing its way back through an open Middle East door. Washington decisionmakers had better take note.

Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.

]]> http://www.inthedays.com/distress-of-nations/putins-middle-east-visit-russia-is-back/feed/ 0 http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/politics-fewer-declarations-and-more-deeds/ http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/politics-fewer-declarations-and-more-deeds/#comments Mon, 13 Nov 2006 18:47:26 +0000 John http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/politics-fewer-declarations-and-more-deeds/ Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh remembers the 1974 incident in the Sinai desert, where a 22-year-old IDF captain named Amir Peretz was caught between two Israeli armored personnel carriers that smashed his legs and severely injured him.

Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s troublebut he shall be saved out of it.
—Jeremiah 30:7

Sneh was the paratrooper brigade’s medical officer at the time of the incident that ended Peretz’s military career and forced him to begin a lengthy process of rehabilitation in a military hospital.

More than three decades later, Sneh has been brought in as a remedy to help Defense Minister Amir Peretz, who was left without a leg to stand on following perceived failures in the IDF’s performance in the second Lebanon War.

At stake for Peretz is the rehabilitation of his political career. At stake for the country is its ability to recover from the war and prepare for the next one.

Until two weeks ago, when Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to appoint Sneh to compensate Peretz for the addition of Israel Beiteinu to the coalition, the government lacked a military authority in any decision-making capacity at the political level.

Decisions were made by “Captain” Peretz and “Sergeant” Olmert, while former generals like Transportation Minister Shaul Mofaz were left out of the loop. (While Mofaz and Binyamin Ben-Eliezer are former generals who serve in the security cabinet, this forum of 13 ministers has long ago stopped making secret operational decisions.) The addition to the cabinet of Strategic Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who only reached the rank of corporal, did not add significant military experience to the inner circle.

That’s why Sneh’s appointment was so significant. He twice ran the Defense Ministry as deputy defense minister, once under Yitzhak Rabin and then under Ehud Barak, two former IDF chiefs of general staff, who served simultaneously as prime minister and defense minister.

Before that, the brigadier-general headed the civil administration in the West Bank, commanded the South Lebanon security zone and led the medical teams in the 1976 Entebbe rescue operation.

This experience should come in handy with threats looming from what Sneh describes as the “quartet of evil”: Iran, Syria, Hizbullah and Hamas. He already made his presence felt this week in deliberations following the apparently errant IDF shelling on Beit Hanun [which resulted in the deaths of 19 civilians].

Sneh will likely do the same with big decisions ahead regarding how Israel reacts to Iran’s attempt to become a nuclear power. In an interview at his office in the Knesset, he said that Israel must act under the assumption that significant international sanctions against Iran would not work, and prepare to prevent the nuclearization of Iran “at all costs.”

“Israel needs to substantially improve its indigenous long-range capacities,” Sneh said. “I am not advocating an Israeli preemptive military action against Iran; I am aware of all its possible repercussions. I consider it a last resort. But even the last resort is sometimes the only resort.”

How do you explain what happened in Beit Hanun on Wednesday?

The disadvantage of artillery of that sort is its lack of accuracy. I don’t have the inquiry results, but it happens that a shell deviates from its course. We prefer to use precise ammunition when possible. But sometimes when you have to cover a broad area to prevent rocket fire, you use artillery and this can happen. It’s most probably our mistake, and I am sincerely sad about it.

We have already heard the media in Gaza calling this incident the “Palestinian Kana massacre.” Do you think Israel will be able to defend itself against this charge?

Such accusations don’t make the suffering any easier, and they won’t prevent future tragedies. There is a difference between military and moral responsibility. From the military point of view, we are responsible, and with all the sorrow, we have to admit it. But the moral responsibility is entirely on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, because we left the Gaza Strip completely, not leaving behind a single soldier. They turned Gaza, especially Beit Hanun, into a launching pad for rockets on our civilians, kibbutzim and Ashkelon, while cynically using their civilian population as a human shield for their terrorist activity. They cannot evade responsibility for this.

It appears that the world is already assigning responsibility to Israel (pointing to CNN on the television next to him). Olmert and Peretz’s apologies are sincere. They offered humanitarian aid. Before the final results of our inquiry, all we can do is say we feel bad about the incident. We are genuinely trying to do something to help the victims. We are not indifferent, but we don’t bear moral responsibility. They need to ask why they continue firing rockets after we left Gaza. The reason is that they are serving interests not of the Palestinian people, but interests abroad, especially of Iran. They serve goals that do not fit with Palestinian interests.

What will be your role be in the Defense Ministry?

I will be in charge of the Home Front Command and of preparing reservists. I will also be involved in the territories.

When The Jerusalem Post asked you, six months ago, what Peretz would do in the Defense Ministry, you said realignment and evacuation of the illegal outposts were the top priorities. In the wake of the second war in Lebanon, those priorities have been shifted. What are your priorities now?

We need to define the national goals of Israel, which should be: A. Preparing the IDF for victory in the next round with Iran and its proxies. B. Promoting an agreement with the Palestinians as quickly as possible. C. Reviving the Israeli welfare state. During the war, the government abandoned poor Israelis. When I walked through shelters in Acre, I saw the Israeli New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. We need to revive the concept of the government’s being responsible for the people.

What should be done instead of realignment?
The coalition guidelines didn’t say ‘realignment.’ They just called for serious efforts to negotiate with the Palestinians. We didn’t even start trying.

You have always had a very close relationship with PA Chairman Mahmoud Abbas. Are you still in contact with him?

I speak to Abu Mazen more than any other Israeli. I speak to other Palestinians, too. I feel there is a majority among Palestinians who support the ideas Abu Mazen advocates. This is not because of his good will, but because most Palestinians understand that Hamas does not give them a future – only agony. Hamas didn’t bring any good to the Palestinians, and it shows. There is no chance for Palestinian society to take off economically without tight cooperation with the Israeli economy. We should take advantage of this. The real rift in the region is between the quartet of evil – Iran, Syria, Hizbullah, Hamas – and all the rest. There is a strong axis of moderate countries: Egypt, Jordan, the Saudis, the Emirates. They are all against Islamic extremism. They consider the Hamas government a dangerous presence for themselves. It’s good for Israel to join with these countries that are all afraid of Iran. They hear [Iranian President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad talk about wiping out Israel, and they know they are next in line. Ahmadinejad won’t tolerate the prosperity of Dubai or other Gulf countries. So the region now is full of dangers and opportunities. We need a very creative policy to forestall the dangers and take advantage of the opportunities – and this is what the government has to do.

Last week, Peretz told the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Ministry that it was important for Israel to keep the crossings between the Gaza Strip and Israel open. Are you working toward that?

Before the airport and seaport, we have to open the crossings. We are working on all of them in the Gaza Strip, and in the meantime, we are also working on crossings between Israel and the West Bank.

What about the so-called “Hizbullization” of Gaza that IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz has warned of?

The way to stop this is militarily, but not only. With military means alone, we cannot change the reality in Gaza. No country on earth would tolerate shelling and weapons on its doorstep. We have to take measures to intercept the smuggling of weapons in the Philadelphi Corridor, or before the final destination – as in Beit Hanun. What should be changed is the economic and political reality in Gaza. The dominance of Hamas in Gaza is due to the poor conditions in Gaza. Hamas thrives in an atmosphere of hunger and despair, and we should change it by improving conditions in Gaza. It’s in our interest to change it. We need responsible forces to be in charge of the crossings, and that’s what the American Dayton plan is about: security and economy. We will do our best as a defense ministry to assist the implementation of the plan. There have been many plans: Mitchell, Zini, Tenet, etc. But I genuinely believe that General Dayton’s plan is the first that will be implemented.

How can Israel stop the Kassam attacks on Sderot?
The rockets can be stopped by tracing and hitting them from the air. Nothing in this business is 100% effective. We hit the places where they are hidden. We identify the squads that fire them. In Beit Hanun, for example, we hit nine squads that fired rockets. But there are others we didn’t hit.

What about the development of longer-range missiles in the Gaza Strip?
They are constantly trying to extend the range. There is no instant success in anti-terrorist warfare, no miracle weapon and no easy victory.

What lessons has the army learned from the recent war in Lebanon?

Not to allow the enemy to stockpile weapons and missiles that will be used against us. You don’t have to be a general to understand that.

How will you use your military experience to compensate for Peretz’s relative lack of it? Didn’t he spend most of his army service in a military hospital, after all?

He was an officer before the incident in the Sinai in 1974, when two armored personnel carriers smashed his legs, and he was badly hurt. I participate in deliberations with the defense minister. I think my humble advice will be listened to and will make a difference. I am a partner in decisions. Some domains are under my authority, and I will do my best.

What should be done to prevent the nuclearization of Iran?

I will divide my answer into different layers. I still hope the international community will take effective sanctions against Iran, though the chances are not high. We should explain to the [western] nations that they are the next targets on Ahmedinejad’s list, and the dangers he poses to western democracies cannot be ignored. My working assumption is that they won’t succeed. Then I have to think about what the Jewish state can do about the danger. The danger isn’t as much Ahmadinejad’s deciding to launch an attack, but Israel’s living under a dark cloud of fear from a leader committed to its destruction. He is inspired by a mystical Islamic belief. He thinks he will bring the Muslim messiah, the 12th Imam. I am afraid that under such a threat, most Israelis would prefer not to live here; most Jews would prefer not to come here with their families; and Israelis who can live abroad will. People are not enthusiastic about being scorched. I am afraid Ahmadinejad will be able to kill the Zionist dream without pushing a button. That’s why we must prevent this regime from obtaining nuclear capability at all costs.

How do we do that?

First of all, by improving our defense systems. We developed and produced the Arrow, the only system that can intercept nuclear missiles. Depending on the altitude, when intercepted, the warheads do not detonate. But Israel needs to substantially improve its indigenous long-range capacities. This is a system against ballistic missiles and not the cheap, stupid rockets that cause all the problems in Sderot. To target those rockets, Peretz asked Defense Minister Director-General Gabi Ashkenazi to submit to him recommendations among four existing anti-missile systems that could be developed and produced. He will submit his recommendations quite soon. I am not advocating an Israeli preemptive military action against Iran, and I am aware of all of its possible repercussions. I consider it a last resort. But even the last resort is sometimes the only resort.

What about the warnings from people who have said that Iran learned from Iraq’s mistake 25 years ago, and instead of one reactor, it has 80?

I will not discuss such operational issues in public. I didn’t as an MK, and I won’t now. I have said the maximum I can say. On the Iranian threat, I prefer fewer declarations and more deeds.

Even if you can’t say what Israel would do, can you at least say that you know what Israel should do?

The worst Israeli words are yihiye beseder [everything will be ok]. My mentor, [Yitzhak] Rabin was against this culture of saying that. It’s against my character to say, “yihiyeh beseder.”

In the 2007 state budget, money should be allocated to prepare the IDF for unquestionable victory in the next round and to improve our indigenous long-range capacities. What’s there now is not enough.

Going back to the “quartet of evil” you mentioned. Syria is part of that group, but Peretz has suggested that Israel should engage in dialogue with the Syrian government. Do you agree with him?

What we want to do is detach [Syrian President Bashar] Assad from the axis of evil. I am sure that we have to test his words, but there is an unbridgeable gap between our position and his. The Syrians want the real-estate assets, and then they will behave themselves. We want them to behave now, and then we can discuss real estate in the future. The first Syrian confidence-building measures should be stopping the stockpiling of Hizbullah weapons, kicking out [Hamas leader Khaled] Mashal and sealing the border with Iran. Then, perhaps, Assad can receive the positive treatment that is now being given to [Libyan dictator Muammar] Gaddafi.

What do you think will be the impact of this week’s US election on Israel?

Fortunately, friendship with Israel is a bipartisan issue in the US. I am sure the House and Senate know what is good for America, and they don’t need my advice.

]]> http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/politics-fewer-declarations-and-more-deeds/feed/ 0 http://www.inthedays.com/israel-in-the-last-days/top-hamas-officials-we-want-all-of-palestine-from-the-river-to-the-sea-resistance-and-jihad-are-legitimate/ http://www.inthedays.com/israel-in-the-last-days/top-hamas-officials-we-want-all-of-palestine-from-the-river-to-the-sea-resistance-and-jihad-are-legitimate/#comments Fri, 10 Nov 2006 16:47:35 +0000 John http://www.inthedays.com/israel-in-the-last-days/top-hamas-officials-we-want-all-of-palestine-from-the-river-to-the-sea-resistance-and-jihad-are-legitimate/ In the nine months since it came to power, and despite the PLO’s demands, Hamas has not changed its views: It refuses to recognize Israel or acknowledge its legitimacy, insists that previous Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements will be recognized only if they serve Palestinian interests, continues to lay claim to all of Palestine, and, in exchange for the establishment of a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, offers only a temporary hudna (ceasefire). In addition, Hamas continues to express reservations about the Arab peace initiative of 2002, and to support resistance, jihad, and abduction of Israeli soldiers.

Israel in the Last Days

”Therefore say, Thus saith the Lord GOD; I will even gather you from the people, and assemble you out of the countries where ye have been scattered,and I will give you the land of Israel.”
—Eze 11:17

Jacob’s Trouble

Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s troublebut he shall be saved out of it.
—Jeremiah 30:7

The following are statements made by Hamas leaders in the last two months:

Rejection of Israel and Its Legitimacy

In an interview, Palestinian Political Bureau head Khaled Mash’al told the daily Al-Hayat: “Why am I required to [recognize] the legitimacy of an occupying [entity] that is sitting on my land when there are millions of Palestinians who come from the land on which this entity is sitting? It is true that there is an entity called Israel, but I do not wish to recognize it.” [1]

At an October 20, 2006 Hamas convention in Khan Yunis, Palestinian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Al-Zahar stated that “Israel is a vile entity that has been planted in our soil, and has no historical, religious or cultural legitimacy. We cannot normalize our relations with this entity. The history of this region has proven [time and again] that occupation is temporary. Thousands of years ago, the Romans occupied this land and [eventually] left. The Persians, Crusaders, and English [also] came and went. The Zionists have come, and they too will leave. [We say] no to recognizing Israel, regardless of the price we may have to pay [for our refusal].” [2]

In a sermon in Khan Yunis, Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail Haniya said: “Israel wants Hamas to hand it the card of recognition in the hope that this would lead to recognition by other Muslim countries. Israel may have been recognized by part of the Palestinian people and by some Arab countries. However, it [now] wants something more significant – the [trump] card of Islamic recognition – and it wants to obtain this recognition through the Palestinian government and Hamas…” [3]

Palestine From the River to the Sea

On the issue of a Palestinian state, Khaled Mash’al said: “The [Hamas] movement has agreed to [the establishment of a Palestinian] state within the 1967 borders and to a hudna… As a Palestinian, I am interested in a Palestinian state and I am not interested in the occupying state. Why do people require the Palestinians [to accept] the existence of two states as one of their principles and goals? The Zionist state exists. I [wish to] speak of my Palestinian state that does not exist. I am the one that has been denied [the right to] a state, to sovereignty, to independence, to liberty, and to self-determination. Therefore, my main [goal] is to focus on obtaining my rights. I wish to establish my state.” [4]

Mahmoud Al-Zahar said: “We [aim to liberate] all our lands… If we have the option, we will establish a state on every inch of land within the 1967 [borders], but this does not by any means imply that we will relinquish our right to all the Palestinian lands. We want all of Palestine from [Ras] Naqura to Rafah, and from the [Mediterranean] sea to the [Jordan] river.” [5]

An announcement issued by Hamas on the occasion of the anniversary of the Kafr Qasem massacre stated: “We will not relinquish a single grain of the soil of Kafr Qasem, or a single inch of stolen Palestinian land. Sooner or later, our people shall return to its land, to its cities and to its villages from which it was expelled…” [6]

On the 2002 Arab (Saudi) Peace Initiative

Hamas Political Bureau Head Musa Abu Marzouq said: “Hamas has serious reservations about the [Arab] initiative since it involves acceptance of two states, Palestine and Israel. Hamas rejects this because it means recognition of Israel.” [7]

Khaled Mash’al also referred to the same topic: “The interested parties [involved] in the Arab-Israeli conflict and in a [potential] settlement never took the Arab initiative seriously. The problem, therefore, does not lie with the initiative or with the Arab countries, but rather with the U.S. and Israel, which reject this initiative and wish to impose the Quartet’s terms on us. In the past, we were told that the [Arab] initiative is only a step [towards a goal]. Then, some of the Arab and Palestinian parties told us, officially, that accepting the Arab initiative is an important step in convincing the international community that [the Palestinians] accept the Quartet’s terms. So they are not interested in the initiative itself but in its end result. That is, [they are interested in the initiative] as a step on the way to accepting the Quartet’s terms. [8]

On the Legitimacy of Resistance and Jihad

In an October 6 speech Ismail Haniya said, “We [derive our] legitimacy from the legitimacy of the jihad. We are a government born from the womb of the resistance, from the womb of the martyrs… We are a government that comes out of resistance and jihad, and out of the desire for resistance and jihad against the Zionist occupation…” [9]

Khaled Mash’al said: “We do not regard our actions as terrorism or violence but as resistance that is legitimate, even according to international law, so I refuse [to use] any term that would imply self-criticism. It is the aggressor [i.e. Israel] that is perpetrating violence and terrorism. It is [Israel] that is employing every type of terrorism against people, against the land, against the holy places and against the [very] trees…As long as my people are in exile and my land is occupied, I have the legitimate right to resist… It is the American injustice and the Zionist aggression that cause terrorism and [create] the climate of terrorism… Had the international community offered us a way to obtain our rights without resistance we would have taken it, since resistance is only a means [for us], not an end.” [10]

]]> http://www.inthedays.com/israel-in-the-last-days/top-hamas-officials-we-want-all-of-palestine-from-the-river-to-the-sea-resistance-and-jihad-are-legitimate/feed/ 0 http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/the-next-war-is-%e2%80%98imminent%e2%80%99/ http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/the-next-war-is-%e2%80%98imminent%e2%80%99/#comments Fri, 10 Nov 2006 16:33:52 +0000 John http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/the-next-war-is-%e2%80%98imminent%e2%80%99/ Israeli news media reported this week that the next war between Israel and the Arabs is expected to break out in summer 2007, and that the IDF is doing everything to ensure it will be ready when the time comes.

“For, lo, the days come, saith the LORD, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah, saith the LORD: and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it. And these are the words that the LORD spake concerning Israel and concerning Judah. For thus saith the LORD; We have heard a voice of trembling, of fear, and not of peace. Ask ye now, and see whether a man doth travail with child? wherefore do I see every man with his hands on his loins, as a woman in travail, and all faces are turned into paleness? Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s trouble; but he shall be saved out of it. or it shall come to pass in that day, saith the LORD of hosts, that I will break his yoke from off thy neck, and will burst thy bonds, and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him: But they shall serve the LORD their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them.”
—Jeremiah 30:3-9

>

But foreign journalists, also this past week, have estimated that Israel could clash with the Syrian army and Lebanon’s Hizb’allah before the end of 2006.

In that event, given that this time-window closes in less than eight weeks’s time, it is unclear how “ready” Israel’s defense forces will be.

Ha’aretz said Monday that Syria and Hizb’allah – the former an Iranian ally, the latter an Iranian proxy force – “are likely to start a war against Israel next summer.”

This is the assessment of Israel’s senior military echelon that, according to that paper is making “all preparations … to ensure maximum preparedness in advance of summer 2007.”

Reporting for London’s The Daily Telegraph on November 3, John Keegan said Israel would soon have to strike Hizb’allah hard.

The Lebanese terrorist organization had reconstructed its fortified zone in southern Lebanon and was racing to replenish its depleted missile supplies.

Hiz’ballah is “also creating a fortified zone in the Gaza Strip and building up its stocks of missiles there.”

The outcome of all this arms buildup would soon see Israel once more facing a missile attack on two fronts.

Keegan’s deduction: “The conflict is inevitable and unavoidable.”

“What is certain is that — probably before the year is out — Israel will have struck at Hizb’allah” in southern Lebanon,” he wrote.’

One reason the IDF believes in an inevitable attack is the Arab sense that Hizb’allah came out on top of the war last July.

The IDF’s inability to stop the Katyusha and other missile fire from Lebanon into the north of Israel, and its ongoing powerlessness to put an end to Kassam rocket fire from the Gaza Strip, have badly eroded its deterrence.

Following the July war – in which Israel failed to achieve any of the goals it announced when it decided to attack southern Lebanon – Jordan’s King Abd’allah told Time Magazine that, in the Arab mind, Israel was no longer considered an “invincible force.”

]]> http://www.inthedays.com/jacobs-trouble/the-next-war-is-%e2%80%98imminent%e2%80%99/feed/ 0 http://www.inthedays.com/distress-of-nations/russia-iran-and-the-nuclear-question-the-putin-record/ http://www.inthedays.com/distress-of-nations/russia-iran-and-the-nuclear-question-the-putin-record/#comments Thu, 09 Nov 2006 19:13:34 +0000 John http://www.inthedays.com/distress-of-nations/russia-iran-and-the-nuclear-question-the-putin-record/ Vladimir Putin inherited a strong Russian-Iranian relationship from his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. Russia under Yeltsin made major arms agreements with Iran, selling Tehran jet planes, tanks, and submarines, and also began building a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr. The two countries also cooperated on regional issues such as Tajikistan and Afghanistan.

Distress of Nations

“And say, Thus saith the Lord GOD; Behold, I am against thee, O Gog, the chief prince of Meshech and Tubal:”
—Eze 38:3

“Persia, Ethiopia, and Libya with them; all of them with shield and helmet:”
—Eze 38:5

Jacob’s Trouble

“For, lo, the days come, saith the LORD, that I will bring again the captivity of my people Israel and Judah, saith the LORD: and I will cause them to return to the land that I gave to their fathers, and they shall possess it. And these are the words that the LORD spake concerning Israel and concerning Judah. For thus saith the LORD; We have heard a voice of trembling, of fear, and not of peace. Ask ye now, and see whether a man doth travail with child? wherefore do I see every man with his hands on his loins, as a woman in travail, and all faces are turned into paleness? Alas! for that day is great, so that none is like it: it is even the time of Jacob’s trouble; but he shall be saved out of it. or it shall come to pass in that day, saith the LORD of hosts, that I will break his yoke from off thy neck, and will burst thy bonds, and strangers shall no more serve themselves of him: But they shall serve the LORD their God, and David their king, whom I will raise up unto them.”
—Jeremiah 30:3-9

While Putin and Iran were to have some problems over Chechnya and the optimal exit route for Caspian Sea oil and natural gas, these problems were overcome by 2005 when Iran emerged as Putin’s most important ally in the Middle East. As Russia sought to reemerge as a major power in the Middle East, Moscow increasingly became Iran’s protector against sanctions.

The reasons behind Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on the nuclear issue included: 1) The sale of the reactor earned hard currency for Russia; 2) Iran had repeatedly hinted to Moscow that once the first reactor was operating, it would purchase a number of additional reactors; 3) The Bushehr reactor, and the factories in Russia which supply it, employ a large number of Russian engineers and technicians and thus help keep Russia’s nuclear industry alive; 4) By standing firm on Bushehr, Putin could demonstrate to domestic audiences Russia’s independent policy vis-a-vis the U.S.

By the fall of 2005 Moscow had to deal, for the first time, with a U.S.-EU alignment on Iran. In the September 2005 IAEA Board of Governors statement that threatened Iran with the possibility of sanctions, Russia abstained, seeking to put off the day of decision as long as possible, although sooner rather than later Moscow will have to choose between Iran and the West.

It would appear that Moscow, despite its rhetoric, has decided to acquiesce in Iran’s nuclear program, most probably because of Putin’s policy of enhancing Russian prestige in the Middle East, and elsewhere in the world, at the expense of the United States. Russia’s policy of dragging out negotiations as long as possible, while protecting Iran from sanctions, certainly strengthens Moscow’s relations with Iran, while at the same time, by keeping oil prices high, it clearly helps the Russian economy.

Iran’s new president is an Islamic “true-believer.” Unlike his predecessors, who were willing to tolerate Russian policy in Chechnya, where Russian soldiers have killed thousands of Muslim Chechens, Ahmadinejad may one day decide that his Islamic beliefs obligate him to confront Russia on this issue. Were Iran to be armed with nuclear weapons, Moscow may wish it had supported sanctions against Iran when it had the opportunity.

Vladimir Putin inherited a strong Russian-Iranian relationship from his predecessor Boris Yeltsin. Russia under Yeltsin made major arms agreements with Iran, selling Tehran jet planes, tanks, and submarines, and also began building a nuclear reactor for Iran at Bushehr. Under Yeltsin, the two countries also cooperated on regional issues such as Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and Yeltsin valued the low Iranian profile during the first Chechen war (1994-1996).

Putin strengthened the relationship further, beginning his rule by abrogating the Gore-Chenonymdin agreement under which Russia was to cease selling arms to Iran by 2000. While Putin and Iran were to have some problems over Chechnya and the optimal exit route for Caspian Sea oil and natural gas, these problems were overcome by 2005 when Iran emerged – despite its clandestine nuclear program – as Putin’s most important ally in the Middle East. As Russia sought to reemerge as a major power in the Middle East, Moscow increasingly became Iran’s protector against the sanctions that first the United States and then also the European Union sought to impose on Iran because of its violation of international agreements. Putin’s policy on Iran, however, contained some serious risks for Moscow, including a sharply deteriorating relationship with the United States, and the possibility that the newly-elected Iranian president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, an Islamic fundamentalist, might one day challenge Russia over its policy in Chechnya.

While Russia’s sale of the Bushehr nuclear power station is central to Iranian-Russian relations, there are a number of other facets of the relationship that are of almost equal importance. These include trade, which by 2005 reached the level of $2 billion per year,1 Russian arms sales to Iran, and diplomatic cooperation in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Both countries also have sought to prevent U.S. hegemony in the world. While there are several areas of conflict in the relationship, the most important of which is the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the two countries can be said to have reached the level of a tactical if not yet a strategic alliance.

Putin’s Foreign Policy
President Vladimir Putin has put a great deal of emphasis on improving Russia’s economy, not only through the sale of arms, oil, and natural gas (the Russian economy has been blessed with high oil and natural gas prices during most of his years in office), but also by selling high tech goods such as nuclear reactors and by expanding Russia’s business ties abroad. Indeed, business interests have played an increasingly significant role in Putin’s foreign policy.

Overall, Putin’s central foreign policy aim has been to strengthen the Russian economy in the hope that Russia might regain its status as a great power. In the interim he has sought to create an “arc of stability” on Russia’s frontiers so that economic development can proceed as rapidly as possible. This was one of the reasons Putin embraced an improved relationship with Turkey and ended Russian opposition to the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. In theory at least, Putin’s goal would appear to require a policy of increased cooperation with the economically advanced West led by the U.S.

At the same time, however, mindful of voices in the Duma (parliament) as well as in the security apparatus and the Russian foreign ministry unhappy at Moscow’s appearing to play “second fiddle” to the U.S. after 9/11, Putin has from time to time asserted an independent position for Russia. Indeed, Russian foreign policy increasingly seeks to create the “multipolar world” advocated by former Russian Foreign Minister and Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, who is now a Putin adviser. The tension involved in cooperating with the U.S. but also competing with it clearly impacts the Russian-Iranian relationship.

Putin and the Impact of September 11
Putin’s decision to draw closer to the U.S. after 9/11, and particularly his acquiescence in the deployment of U.S. troops in Central Asia was very dimly viewed by Tehran. Iranian radio noted on December 18, 2001, following the U.S. military victory in Afghanistan, “some political observers say that the aim of the U.S. diplomatic activities in the region is to carry out certain parts of U.S. foreign policy, so as to expand its sphere of influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and this is to lessen Russia’s traditional influence in the region.”2

A second problem in post-9/11 Russian-Iranian relations dealt with the Caspian Sea. When, due to Iranian obstinacy, an April 2002 Caspian summit failed, Putin moved to assert Russian authority in the region. First, there was a May 2002 agreement with Kazakhstan to jointly develop the oil fields lying in disputed waters between them; second, a major Russian naval exercise took place in the Caspian in early August 2002 with 60 ships and 10,000 troops, witnessed by Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. The exercises took place on the 280th anniversary of Peter the Great’s naval campaign in the Caspian, both Kazakhstan and Azerbaizhan participated, and Putin called the purpose of the exercise” part of the war against terrorism.”3 Finally, in September 2002 Putin and Azeri leader Gaidar Aliev signed an agreement dividing the seabed between them but holding the water in common.4

Iran, however, sought to demonstrate that it would not be cowed by the Russian military move. In September 2003, while Iranian foreign ministry spokesman Hamid-Reza Asefi was stressing that the militarization of the Caspian Sea would never ensure the security of littoral states, Iran launched a “Paykan” missile boat into the Caspian “to protect the interests of the Iranian nation.”5

Nuclear Issues Become Central – 2002-2005
While Russian-Iranian tension rose over the Caspian, Russian nuclear reactor sales and arms sales continued. In July 2002, just a few weeks before the major military exercises on the Caspian, Moscow announced that not only would it finish the Bushehr reactor (despite U.S. opposition), but also stated it had begun discussions on building five additional reactors for Iran.6

As Moscow stepped up nuclear sales to Tehran, the U.S. sought to dissuade Russia through a carrot-and-stick approach, threatening to withhold $20 billion in aid to dismantle the old Soviet military arsenal, while also promising $10 billion in additional aid for Moscow.7 Meanwhile, support for the Chechens by Iranian newspapers, including those close to Khameini, raised questions in the minds of at least some Russians as to whether Moscow was backing the wrong side in the U.S.-Iranian dispute over the Iranian nuclear program.8

There appear to be four central reasons behind Moscow’s unwillingness to cooperate with Washington on the nuclear issue. First, the sale of the reactor earned hard currency for Russia, and Putin could not be sure that at a time of escalating deficits in the U.S., the U.S. Congress would support aid to Russia. Second, once the first reactor was operating, Iran has repeatedly hinted to Moscow that it would purchase a number of additional reactors. Third, the Bushehr reactor, and the factories in Russia which supply it, employ a large number of Russian engineers and technicians and thus help keep Russia’s nuclear industry alive – both to earn money and to help in the development of high tech for the Russian economy. Finally, by standing firm on Bushehr, Putin could demonstrate to domestic audiences Russia’s independent policy vis-a-vis the U.S.

Yet such a policy held dangers for Moscow. First, it served to alienate the United States, despite constant Russian protestations that the Bushehr reactor would only be used for peaceful purposes. Second, especially as revelations emerged about the extent of the Iranian nuclear program, Moscow ran the danger that either the U.S. or Israel might attack the Bushehr reactor. The problem became especially serious for Russia in December 2002 when it was revealed in a series of satellite photographs that, in addition to Bushehr, Iran was building two new nuclear facilities, one a centrifuge plant near the city of Natanz and the other a heavy water plant near the city of Arak.9 Initially, Russia downplayed the development, with the Director of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom), Alexander Rumantsev, stating that Russia had nothing to do with the two plants. Other representatives of Minatom said Russia was ready to supply nuclear fuel to Tehran, but only if the Iranians guaranteed the return of the spent fuel to Moscow. Rumantsev, however, said Russia was ready to supply nuclear fuel to Iran without conditions.10

In March 2003, with an IAEA team visiting the two plants, Rumantsev asserted that Russia could not tell whether Iran was secretly developing nuclear weapons: “While Russia is helping Iran build its nuclear plant (at Bushehr), it is not being informed by Iran on all the other projects currently underway.”11

Following its initial successes in the Iraq war, the U.S. stepped up pressure on Russia. In response, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov noted in May 2003 that Russia wanted all Iranian nuclear programs to be under the supervision of the IAEA.12

Following the Bush-Putin talks in St. Petersburg in June 2003 when Bush was at the height of his international influence following the fall of Baghdad, Putin asserted that the positions of Russia and the U.S. on Iran were closer than people thought. However, he added that “the pretext of an Iranian nuclear weapons program (could be used) as an instrument of unfair competition against Russian companies.”13

The U.S. was making two demands on Russia regarding the Bushehr reactor. First, while the U.S. wanted Russia to end all support for Bushehr, at a minimum, the U.S. argued that Moscow should not supply any nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor unless Iran agreed to send all used fuel back to Moscow. Second, Moscow should also withhold the nuclear fuel until Iran had signed an additional protocol with the IAEA permitting that agency unannounced visits to all Iranian nuclear facilities. On this issue, the G-8 (of which Russia is a member) issued a statement noting: “We urge Iran to sign and implement the IAEA Additional Protocol without delay or conditions. We offer our strongest support to comprehensive IAEA examination of this country’s nuclear program.”14

The question, of course, was how far Russia would go to pressure Iran. While British Prime Minister Tony Blair asserted that Moscow had agreed not to deliver nuclear fuel until Iran signed the IAEA protocol, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko stated that Moscow would only freeze construction on the Bushehr plant if Iran refused to agree to return all spent nuclear fuel to Russia, and that Iran was not required to sign the protocol because “the protocol is an agreement that is signed on a voluntary basis.”15

Meanwhile, Minatom Minister Rumanstev announced on June 3, 2003, that the Bushehr reactor would be completed in 2005, not 2004 as originally planned. While he blamed the delay on the need to replace the reactor’s original German parts, it could well be that this was a gesture to deflect some U.S. pressure.16 In September 2003 a dispute between Russia and Iran broke out over who would pay for the return of the spent fuel from the reactor, with Iran demanding that Russia pay for it and Moscow refusing.

The EU sent a delegation to Tehran in October 2003 which succeeded in extracting an agreement to temporarily stop enriching uranium and to sign the additional protocol as well as to inform the IAEA of its past nuclear activities. Moscow hailed the Iranian action, and the head of the Iranian Security Council, Hassan Rowhani, came to Moscow on November 11 to formally announce that Tehran was temporarily suspending the enrichment of uranium and was sending a letter to the IAEA agreeing to the additional protocol.17 Moscow declared that Iran was now in full compliance with the IAEA, and Putin said that now Russia and Iran would continue their nuclear cooperation.18 Indeed, Foreign Ministry spokesman Alexander Yakovenko, eyeing the possible sale of additional reactors to Tehran, said Russia would now “do its utmost to expedite the completion of Bushehr.”19

In part because of Russian (and EU) pressure, the Board of Governors of the IAEA in November 2003 decided not to refer Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council. Less than two months later, revelations about Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation policies, including to Iran, led IAEA chief Muhammed ElBaradei to warn about the collapse of the non-proliferation system. IAEA inspectors found that Iran had hidden (and not told the IAEA about), among other things, an advanced P-2 centrifuge system that could be used for enriching uranium, along with a program for producing polonium 210 which could be used as a neutron initiator for nuclear weapons.20

Completing the Bushehr Reactor
The central factor in Russian-Iranian relations in 2004 was the question of when Russia would complete the Bushehr nuclear reactor. Throughout 2004 either the IAEA continued to find that Iran was hiding information about its nuclear activities, or Iran was reneging on agreements it had already made with the IAEA and/or the EU-3 (Germany, France and England). This, in turn, brought heavy U.S. pressure on Russia to hold off supplying nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor project, lest this enhanced Iranian efforts to develop a nuclear bomb. As 2004 wore on, the Russian leaders appeared to be somewhat persuaded by the U.S. argument and their criticism of Tehran mounted.

In November 2004, Iran signed an agreement with the EU-3 to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities “on a voluntary basis.” The goal of the EU-3 was to have Iran permanently suspend its enrichment activities and end its nuclear fuel cycle program, and the EU was prepared to offer Iran guarantees of fuel supply and management for Iran’s nuclear power program and also to help Iran acquire a light-water research reactor if Iran cancelled its plans to build a heavy-water research reactor.21 Almost immediately, however, Iran seemed to back off from the agreement, with Hassan Rowhani, Iran’s chief negotiator, saying, “The length of the suspension will only be for the length of the negotiations with the Europeans and…must be rational and not too long. We’re talking about months, not years.”22

The EU-3 deflected pressure from Russia and helped prevent not only a referral of Iran’s nuclear program to the UN Security Council, but also possible U.S. and/or Israeli military action against Iran’s nuclear installations. On the other hand, Moscow faced the possibility that, despite Iran’s constant backsliding, the EU-3/Iran agreement of November 30, 2004, might actually take hold and, if so, the EU states could become competitors in Iran’s nuclear market.23

It was clear throughout 2004 that Iran was seeking to wriggle out of its commitments to the IAEA and EU-3, and Moscow appeared to take an increasingly tough tone with Tehran on nuclear issues. Thus Putin, in June 2004, threatened that “Russia will halt its work at Bushehr if Iran refuses to behave in an open manner and fails to comply with the IAEA’s demands.” Similarly, when meeting with French leader Jacques Chirac and German leader Gerhard Schroeder in September, Putin stated Russia’s opposition to an “expansion of the club of nuclear powers, notably through the addition of Iran.”24

Putin himself, as the final negotiations with the EU-3 wound down, warned, “We are engaged in bilateral negotiations with Iran. We are helping it use nuclear power for peaceful purposes. If final agreements are achieved, we will continue this cooperation.” When agreement was reached at the end of November, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Kislyak said, “we also welcome Iran’s decision to freeze all uranium enrichment programs. This is a voluntary, trust-building measure. We hope this decision will be reliably fulfilled.”25 The Russian Foreign Ministry noted, “a full and sustained fulfillment of this voluntary undertaking, with due monitoring on the part of the IAEA, is essential for the settlement of remaining issues regarding Iran’s nuclear program.”26

Moscow’s Changed Position – 2005-2006
Moscow’s sharp rhetoric vis-a-vis Tehran began to fade in 2005. In the latter part of 2004 Putin had suffered a number of embarrassing failures, both internally and externally, with the debacle in Beslan demonstrating just how far Putin was from normalizing the situation in Chechnya, and the pro-Western “Orange Revolution” in the Ukraine apparently indicating the defection of Russia’s most important CIS neighbor. Consequently, Putin seems to have decided that he had to demonstrate both his own and Russia’s continuing importance in world affairs. Asserting Russia’s role in the Middle East and reinforcing his alliance with Iran were ways to do this.27

The process included inviting Iran to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as an observer, and also to join the planned Caspian Sea security organization (Iran eagerly accepted both invitations). The two countries also stepped up planning for a north-south transportation corridor through Azerbaijan. In addition, Moscow launched a satellite for Iran and discussed the possible sale of submarine-launched missiles with a range of 200 kilometers to be fitted on submarines Russia had already sold to Iran.28 Such a sale would greatly complicate the activities of the U.S. fleet in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region, as well as U.S.-Russian relations.

In early 2005, Iran became increasingly critical of the delay in Russia’s completion of the reactor. Indeed, a commentary by Mehdi Mohammadi in Kehyan in January 2005 asserted that “the breaches of promise, subterfuge, and mischief-making of the Russians in the field of peaceful nuclear cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now a repeated saga.29 However, in February 2005, Russia signed the final agreement for the supply of nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor.30 Under the agreement, all spent fuel was to be returned to Russia, thus, in theory at least, preventing its diversion to atomic weapons. The agreement came after a Bush-Putin summit in which the U.S. and Russia pledged to work together against nuclear proliferation.31

Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, warned that Iran would never permanently cease enriching uranium, and if the U.S. sought sanctions at the UN Security Council, “The security and stability of the region would become a problem.” Rowhani also stated that Iran was not happy with the pace of negotiations with the EU-3, and threatened to end the negotiations if there was no progress.32

In March 2005 the U.S. agreed to join the EU in offering economic incentives to Iran if it gave up its nuclear program.33 Several months later, however, in Iran an Islamic hard-liner, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, was elected president. Consequently, when the EU-3 presented its proposal to Ahmadinejad’s government on August 5, 2005, it was contemptuously rejected as a “joke.”34 The proposal called for a long-term EU-Iranian relationship which combined security and economic incentives, including giving Iran access to international technologies for light-water reactors, in return for Iran agreeing not to withdraw from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and keeping all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.35 Iran also announced it was resuming work at the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, where it would transform uranium into nuclear fuel.36 The EU-3 then cancelled further talks with Iran, and the issue was referred to the IAEA.37

The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a statement on August 9 asserting that “it would be a wise decision on the part of Iran to stop enriching uranium and renew cooperation with the IAEA.”38 French President Jacques Chirac warned that Iran would face censure by the UN Security Council if it did not reinstate a freeze on sensitive nuclear activities.39 The Russian Foreign Ministry, however, stated on September 5 that it was opposed to reporting Iran to the UN Security Council.40

At the UN in mid-September, Ahmadinejad delivered a fiery attack on the U.S. and Israel, while asserting that Iran would never give up its plans to enrich uranium.41 When the IAEA met in late September, Russia asserted its opposition to referring Iran’s nuclear program to the UNSC, with the Russian Foreign Ministry saying it considered such proposals to be “counterproductive and noncondusive to the search for a solution to the problem by political and diplomatic methods.”42 While Russia (and eleven other countries) chose to abstain, an IAEA resolution passed 22-1 finding that Iran’s “failures and breaches…constitute non-compliance with Iran’s agreement to let the international body verify that its nuclear program is purely peaceful.” The resolution noted that the “absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes has given rise to questions that are within the competence of the Security Council.” It called on Iran to resuspend conversion of uranium at its Isfahan plant and asked Tehran to return to negotiations with the EU-3.43

While Moscow did not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, it also did not want sanctions brought against one of its closest allies, who was also a very good customer, buying not only the Bushehr nuclear reactor (and possibly more in the future) but military equipment as well. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice traveled to Russia in October 2005 to seek Russian support for sanctions on Iran. However, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated that Russia wanted to pursue negotiations in the IAEA rather than go to the UNSC, noting, “We think that the current situation permits us to develop this issue and do everything possible within the means of this organization [the IAEA] without referring this issue to other organizations, so far.”44 Putin echoed Lavrov’s position in a telephone call to Ahmadinejad, in which he reportedly stated: “The need was stressed for decisions on all relevant issues to be made using political methods within the legal framework of the IAEA. In connection to this, the Russian President advocated the further development of Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA, including with the aim of renewing the negotiations process.”45

Nonetheless, Iran was to prove a difficult ally for Russia. After Ahmadinejad told Iranian students on October 26 that not only must Israel “be wiped off the map” but also that any country which recognizes Israel “will burn in the fire of the Islamic nation’s fury,”46 Foreign Minister Lavrov stated: “What I saw on CNN is unacceptable. We will convey our standpoint to the Iranian side. We’re inviting the Iranian ambassador to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and will ask him to explain the motives behind this kind of statement.” He also noted that these kinds of statements “do not facilitate the efforts of those who want to normalize the situation surrounding Iran.”47

Following a November 24 IAEA meeting, Russia signed a $1 billion arms deal with Iran that included $700 million for surface-to-air missiles that could be deployed to protect Iran’s nuclear installations.48

Iran’s January 2006 announcement that it would enrich additional uranium effectively ended talks with the EU-3, which called on the Security Council to take action against Iran.49 When the IAEA met in early February 2006, it noted Iran’s unwillingness to provide inspectors with the necessary information about its nuclear program and voted 27-3 (with 5 abstentions) to refer Iran to the UN Security Council in March if Tehran failed to “restore the international community’s confidence in its nuclear program.”50 While Russia voted for the resolution, the additional month was aimed at giving Moscow time to win Iran over to its plan to enrich Iranian uranium in Russia. Meanwhile, Putin, seeking to build-up Russia’s technological base, announced a program to make Russia a world center for uranium enrichment.51

In response to the IAEA decision, Iranian President Ahmadinejad ordered industrial-level nuclear enrichment, halted surprise visits by the IAEA to its nuclear installations, and ordered the IAEA to remove seals and surveillance equipment at some Iranian nuclear facilities.52 Russian-Iranian talks collapsed in early March, primarily because Iran continued to demand the right to enrich uranium domestically.53

As the time for UN Security Council deliberations on Iran neared, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov floated the idea of letting Iran do a limited amount of nuclear enrichment domestically while the bulk of the enrichment would be done in Russia. While this idea appeared to have the endorsement of IAEA chief ElBaradei, U.S. opposition killed it.54

On the eve of the UN Security Council debate, Lavrov was sharply critical of Iranian behavior during its talks with Russia: “We are extremely disappointed with Tehran’s conduct during these talks. Iran is absolutely failing to help those [parties] who are seeking peaceful ways to resolve this problem. Contradictory signals are coming from Tehran. One day they reject it, the next day they don’t.”55

Despite the criticism, Russia took a strong stand against the possible imposition of sanctions against Iran. The end result was a non-binding resolution which, while expressing “serious concern” about Iran’s actions, contained no threat of sanctions.56

In April 2006, on the eve of a visit by ElBaradei to Iran to ascertain Iran’s compliance with the Security Council resolution, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had succeeded in enriching uranium and had “joined the club of nuclear countries” by putting into successful operation a cascade of 164 centrifuges.57 While this number was insufficient to provide sufficient enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization’s Deputy Director, Mohamed Saeedi, said that within a year the number of centrifuges in operation would be 3,000 (in the opinion of most observers, enough for a nuclear weapon, if the centrifuges were competently managed), and in the future Iran would bring 54,000 centrifuges on line.58

In reaction, Russian atomic energy head Sergei Kiriyenko downplayed Iran’s ability to create a nuclear bomb,59 while Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov called Iran’s announcement “a step in the wrong direction,”60 though he also asserted, “We are convinced that neither sanctions nor the use of force will lead to a solution of this problem.”61

On April 21, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Nicholas Burns called for Russia to stop providing weapons to Iran and to end assistance to the Bushehr nuclear project. These demands were immediately rejected by Russian officials who stated the projects would go on unless the UN Security Council imposed sanctions – an unlikely possibility given Russian opposition to sanctions.62

The IAEA report of April 28, 2006, concluded that because of gaps in information, “including the role of the military in Iran’s nuclear program, the agency is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.”63 Following the report, the U.S. and its European allies pushed for sanctions on Iran, though Russia continued to resist sanctions and also opposed any kind of military action against Iran. Russia’s new UN representative, Vitaly Churkin, stated: “We are convinced that there is no military solution to the problem. However, complicated and difficult it may be, a political and diplomatic solution to this problem needs to be sought.”64 Meanwhile, in an effort to persuade Russia not to support a sanctions resolution, Iran offered a major economic incentive – the chance to be the preferred bidder on two additional nuclear reactors,65 a development that would not only earn Russia valuable hard currency, but would also fit nicely into Putin’s high-tech economic program.

Conclusions
Through most of Putin’s presidency, Moscow has been torn between its desire to maintain good relations with Iran – a diplomatic ally in many sensitive areas of Eurasia and a major purchaser of Russian arms and nuclear equipment – and increasing pressure from the U.S. and the EU to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. As Russian President Putin has said on numerous occasions, Russia does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons.

After Iranian efforts to hide parts of its nuclear program became evident in December 2002, Russia joined with the EU to get Iranian acceptance of the additional protocol to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty which allows the IAEA to make unannounced inspection visits to Iranian nuclear installations.

By the fall of 2005 there was a marked increase in the level of cooperation between the EU-3 and the United States over Iran, along with the electoral defeat of German Prime Minister Gerhard Schroeder who had opposed U.S. policy on Iran. Thus Moscow, for the first time, had to deal with a U.S.-EU alignment on Iran. The new hard-line Iranian president, Mahmud Ahmadinejad, not only contemptuously rejected the EU-3 plan presented in August 2005, but, by threatening to wipe Israel off the map, and asserting that the Holocaust was a “myth,” raised serious questions about Iranian claims of “peaceful” intentions for their nuclear program. In the September 2005 IAEA Board of Governors statement that threatened Iran with the possibility of sanctions, Russia abstained. Russia has sought to put off the day of decision as long as possible, although sooner rather than later Moscow will have to choose between Iran and the West.

Looking at Russia’s behavior throughout 2005, it would appear that Moscow, despite its rhetoric, has decided to acquiesce in Iran’s nuclear program, most probably because of Putin’s policy of enhancing Russian prestige in the Middle East, and elsewhere in the world, at the expense of the United States. However, Russia’s policy of dragging out negotiations as long as possible, while protecting Iran from sanctions, contains both benefits and risks for Moscow. It certainly strengthens Moscow’s relations with Iran, while at the same time, by keeping oil prices high, it clearly helps the Russian economy.

Yet this policy carries a number of risks for Russia. First, Iran’s new president is an Islamic “true-believer.” Unlike his predecessors, who were willing to tolerate Russian policy in Chechnya, where Russian soldiers have killed thousands of Muslim Chechens, Ahmadinejad may one day decide that his Islamic beliefs obligate him to confront Russia on this issue. Were Iran to be armed with nuclear weapons, Moscow may wish it had supported sanctions against Iran when it had the opportunity.

A more immediate concern for Moscow is the fact that as Iran draws closer to a nuclear weapons capability, the possibility of a U.S. (or Israeli) strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities increases. Moscow may therefore soon be faced with the choice of agreeing to limited sanctions or acquiescing in another attack by the U.S. on one of its allies.

* * *

Notes
1. “Russian Presidential service says [Russia is] ready for nuclear cooperation with Iran,” Interfax, October 25, 2005, FBIS-Russia, October 26, 2005.
2. “U.S. military presence in Central Asia to lessen Russian influence,” Radio Iran, December 10, 2001, FBIS-MESA, December 18, 2001.
3. Alexander Reutov, “Russia conclusively defines its borders on the Caspian,” Kommersant, September 24, 2002, CDSP, vol. 54, no. 39, p. 17.
4. Ibid., p. 18.
5. “Paykan missile boat floats in Caspian,” Ambo News, September 29, 2003.
6. Cited in article by Sergei Leskov, Izvestia, August 1, 2002, CDSP, vol. 54, no. 31, p. 17-18.
7. Ibid., p. 18.
8. Maxim Yugin, “Ayatollahs support terrorists,” Izvestia, October 31, 2002, CDSP, vol. 54, no. 44, p. 23.
9. For a useful survey of the Iranian nuclear installations, see Joseph Cirincione, et al., Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Threats, second edition (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 2005), ch. 15. See also William Broad and David Sanger, “Relying on Computer, U.S. Seeks to Prove Iran’s Nuclear Aims,” New York Times, November 13, 2005.
10. See Guy Dinmore, “Russia ready to supply N-fuel to Iran,” Financial Times, December 24, 2002.
11. Cited in Ali Akbar Dareini, “Iran’s first nuclear power plant 70 percent constructed,” AP, Washington Times, March 12, 2003.
12. “Moscow-Tehran cooperation gives no grounds for criticism – Russian Foreign Minister,” Interfax, May 28, 2003, FBIS-Russia Diplomatic Panorama, May 28, 2003.
13. Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia needs Iran proof or incentives,” Moscow Times, June 3, 2003.
14. Cited in “Primary points from the statements of the Group of 8,” New York Times, June 3, 2003. See also Judy Dempsey, “EU presses Iran on nuclear arms,” Financial Times, May 27, 2003.
15. Cited in Vladimir Isachenko, “Russia will ship nuclear fuel to Iran,” Washington Post, June 5, 2003.
16. Cited in Ibid.
17. Seth Mydans, “Russia ready to help Iran with A-plant,” New York Times, November 11, 2003.
18. Ibid.
19. Cited in “Russian spokesman calls meetings with Rowhani ‘constructive’,” IRNA (Tehran), November 13, 2003, FBIS-MESA, November 13, 2003.
20. See Scott Peterson, “Evidence of possible work on nukes tests Iran’s credibility,” Christian Science Monitor, February 26, 2004; and Carla Anne Robbins, “U.N. report ties nuclear program to Iran’s military,” Wall Street Journal, February 25, 2004.
21. For a Russian view of this possibility, see Arthur Blinov and Andrey Vaganov, “Iran-Iraq slap in Moscow’s face: Russia sidelined when questions of freezing Tehran’s nuclear program and writing off Baghdad’s debt are tackled,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 23, 2004, FBIS-Russia, November 24, 2004.
22. Cited in Dmitry Suslov, “Iranian Draw,” Russky Kuryer, June 13, 2004, CDSP, vol. 56, no. 24, p. 15.
23. Cited in Alexei Andreyev, “Sochi Three,” Russky Kuryer, September 1, 2004, CDSP, vol. 56, no. 35, p. 19.
24. “Putin says [he] applauds Iran’s decision to suspend uranium enrichment programs,” Interfax, November 25, 2004, FBIS-Russia, November 25, 2004.
25. “Russian Foreign Ministry welcomes [well-balanced] IAEA resolution on Iran,” Interfax, November 30, 2004, FBIS-Russia, November 30, 2004.
26. “Russia hopes Iran to continue cooperation with IAEA,” ITAR-TASS, November 30, 2004, FBIS-Russia, November 30, 2004.
27. During the early part of 2005 Putin decided to sell surface-to-air missiles to Syria, and he also visited Egypt, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority in April. Russia also protected Syria from sanctions because of its behavior in Lebanon, and in 2006 Putin invited a Hamas delegation to Moscow – in direct opposition to U.S. policy.
28. “Russia will equip Iranian subs with missiles,” Kommersant, July 5, 2005. Cited in Habalar Report, July 6, 2005. See also “Russian shipyard plans to upgrade Iranian submarines with 200 km club-5 missile,” Agenstvo Voyennykh Novostey, FBIS-Russia, July 6, 2005. The talks continued into 2006.
29. Mehdi Mohammadi, “Gone with the wind,” Keyhan, January 2005, FBIS-MESA, January 9, 2005.
30. Scott Peterson, “Russia fuels Iran’s atomic bid,” Christian Science Monitor, February 28, 2005.
31. Peter Baker, “U.S.-Russian pact aimed at nuclear terrorism,” Washington Post, February 24, 2005.
32. Cited in Nazila Fathi, “Iran says it won’t give up program to enrich uranium,” New York Times, March 6, 2005.
33. David Sanger, “U.S. and European allies agree on steps in Iranian dispute,” New York Times, March 11, 2005.
34. “Iran Foreign Ministry spokesman dismisses EU proposal as a ‘joke’; notes three ‘flaws’,” Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Tehran), August 7, 2005, FBIS-MESA, August 8, 2005.
35. For the text of the EU proposals, see Mehr News Agency, “Full text of EU nuclear proposals,” August 5, 2005, FBIS-MESA, August 6, 2005.
36. Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran resumes uranium work, ignores warning,” Washington Post, August 9, 2005.
37. Kathrin Benhold, “Europeans call off talks as Iran balks on nuclear issue,” New York Times, August 24, 2005.
38. “Russian Foreign Ministry urges Iran to stop uranium conversion without delay,” RIA, Moscow Times, August 10, 2005.
39. Elaine Sciolino, “Chirac warns Iran of penalty if it continues nuclear work,” New York Times, August 30, 2005.
40. “Russia opposes reporting Iran to UNSC,” New York Times, September 5, 2005.
41. Cited in Dafna Linzer, “Iran’s President does what U.S. diplomacy could not,” Washington Post, September 19, 2005.
42. “Russia opposes referral of Iran to UN Security Council,” ITAR-TASS, September 22, 2005, FBIS-Russia, September 23, 2005.
43. For the full text of the IAEA resolution, see IAEA website, “Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran,” resolution adopted on September 24, 2005.
44. Robin Wright, “Rice is rebuffed by Russia on Iran,” Washington Post, October 16, 2005.
45. “Russia: Putin advocates Iran developing cooperation with the IAEA, renewing talks,” Interfax, October 25, 2005, FBIS-Russia, October 26, 2005.
46. Cited in Nazila Fathi, “Iran’s new President says Israel must be wiped off the map,” New York Times, October 27, 2005.
47. Cited in Ivan Groshkov, “Iranian President’s anti-Israeli remarks viewed; deemed dirty trick on Lavrov,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 30, 2005, FBIS-Russia, November 1, 2005.
48. See Andrew Kramer, “Russia to sell anti-aircraft missiles to Iran in billion dollar deal,” New York Times, December 3, 2005. See also Lyuba Pronina, “Moscow inks arms deal with Tehran,” Moscow Times, December 5, 2005; and “Russian official says sales of Tor-MI missile systems to Iran to continue,” Ria-Novosti, December 15, 2005, FBIS-Russia, December 16, 2005.
49. Elaine Sciolino, “Iran proposes new talks with Europeans who are mostly dismissive,” New York Times, January 18, 2006.
50. Cited in Artur Blinov, “Tehran agrees to talks with Moscow,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, February 6, 2006, CDSP, vol. 58, no. 6, p. 18. See also Michael Adler, “Iran nuclear issue to be reported to UN Security Council,” AFP, February 5, 2006, FBIS-MESA, February 6, 2006.
51. “Russian Atomic Chief hopes Iran to be first to join enrichment center,” ITAR-TASS, February 8, 2006, FBIS-Russia, February 9, 2006.
52. Blinov, loc. cit., and Ali Akbar Dareini, “Nuclear inspections are curbed by Iran,” AP, Washington Post, February 6, 2006; and Alissa Rubin, “Rejecting cooperation, Iran asks IAEA to remove seals, cameras,” Los Angeles Times (on-line edition), February 7, 2006.
53. Oliver Bullough, “No nuclear breakthrough as Iran stands fast,” AP, Moscow Times, March 2, 2006.
54. Elaine Sciolino, “Russia and West split on Iran nuclear issue,” New York Times, March 7, 2006; and “IAEA’s ElBaradei favors Iran ‘small-scale’ nuclear program,” AFP North European Service, February 16, 2006, FBIS-Russia, February 18, 2006.
55. Cited in Neil Buckley, et al., “Moscow may be losing patience with Tehran stance in nuclear stand-off,” Financial Times, March 14, 2006.
56. The text of the March 29, 2006, statement was published in the Washington Post (on-line edition), March 30, 2006.
57. Cited in Moscow Times, April 12, 2006.
58. Cited in Mehr News Agency, “Official says Iran informed IAEA of plan to complete Natanz Site, 3,000 centrifuges,” April 12, 2006, FBIS-MESA, April 13, 2006. See also Henry Mayer, “Iran vows to boost uranium program,” AP, Moscow Times, April 13, 2006.
59. “Russian Atomic head says Iran nuclear problem may have diplomatic solution,” ITAR-TASS, April 14, 2006, FBIS-Russia, April 15, 2006.
60. Cited in “World united in alarm over Iran nuclear advance,” AFP/Reuters, Turkish Times (on-line edition), April 13, 2006.
61. Cited in Simon Saradzhyan, “Russia seeks Iran diplomacy,” Moscow Times, April 19, 2006.
62. Paul Richter and Kim Murphy, “U.S. wants embargo on arms to Iran,” Los Angeles Times (on-line edition), April 22, 2006.
63. Cited in Maggie Farley and Alissa J. Rubin, “UN Nuclear Agency takes steps toward sanctions on Iran,” Los Angeles Times (on-line edition), April 29, 2006. See also Elaine Sciolino, “UN agency says Iran falls short on nuclear data: enrichment is confirmed,” New York Times, April 29, 2006.
64. Cited in “Russia’s UN envoy rules out threat of force in Iran resolution,” ITAR-TASS, May 3, 2006, FBIS-Russia, May 4, 2006.
65. “Russia ready to bid for new Iranian nuclear contracts,” ITAR-TASS, May 2, 2006, FBIS-Russia, May 4, 2006. See also “Iranian envoy says Russian bid for new nuclear contracts to be viewed favorably,” Interfax, FBIS-Russia, April 23, 2006.

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Dr. Robert O. Freedman, an Associate of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, is Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone Professor of Political Science at Baltimore Hebrew University and is Visiting Professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He is currently completing a book on Russian policy toward the Middle East since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

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